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Abstract
The	article	elaborates	on	two	kinds	of	relations	between	people	that	seem	crucial	
to	understanding	what	is	the	real	nature	of	processes	going	on	in	society.	First,	each	
of	the	relations	is	characterized	with	cybernetic	nomenclature.	Then	the	relations	are	
compared	and	their	 intrinsic	properties	are	showed.	The	last	section	pictures	their	
consequences for shaping the contemporary society.
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Resumen
Este artículo profundiza en dos formas de relación entre la gente que parecen 
esenciales para comprender la verdadera naturaleza de los procesos que tienen lugar 
en la sociedad. En primer lugar, cada una de estas relaciones es caracterizada según 
la nomenclatura cibernética. Posteriormente, se procede a una comparación de tales 
relaciones y se muestran las propiedades que les son inherentes. En la última sección 
se describen sus consecuencias para la formación de la sociedad contemporánea.
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For	the	state	is	by	definition	a	system	of	oppression	and	bondage	and	depend-
ence	of	man	on	man.	And	if	someone	says	 that	difference	makes	here	 the	will	of	
voters announced in democracy once in several years, then I’ll respond that for the 
structure	there	is	no	difference	whatsoever:	the	point	is	not	who	governs,	but	that	he	
governs.1
1. Introduction
The subject of the article is the analysis of voluntary and coercive relations that 
exist	between	people	in	society.	Section	1	characterizes	both	types	of	relations,	sec-
tion 2 elaborates on their genesis and dependence and section 3 gives a perspective 
on	their	evolution.	The	article	is	ended	with	conclusive	overview.
The	article	is	written	from	cybernetic	perspective.2 We also refer in it to various 
sciences (including biology, anthropology, economy and game theory) using method-
ological apparatus prima facie different	than	systemic	which	is	stricte cybernetic tool.
From	 the	 cybernetics	 point	 of	 view,	 each	 human	 is	 a	 relatively	 isolated	 com-
plex system.3 Due to its biological structure it recognizes the environment via cogni-
tive	representations	which	are	the	environment’s	homomorphic	(not	isomorphic,	in	
mathematical	sense)	mapping	in	the	nervous	system;	this	means	that	there	is	no	mu-
tual	equivalence	between	the	representations	and	the	environment.	Because	of	this,	
the	model	of	the	world	on	which	human	beings	operate	is	in	fact	only	an	incomplete	
mapping of the full energetic connections in the environment. This in turn results 
in	human	knowledge	being	subjective	and	tacit	and	in	consequence	people’s	values	
preference being also subjective and tacit.
1	B.	Gierosławski,	“Apoliteja,	czyli	rzecz	o	Państwie	Niebytu”	[Apoliteia,	that	is	on	the	State	of	Non-
being],	in	J.	Dukaj,	Lód [Ice],	Kraków,	Wydawnictwo	Literackie,	2007,	p.	645.
2	We	consider	cybernetics	as	the	extension	of	physics	i.	e.	a	field	of	science	investigating	all	energetic	
interactions	between	natural	systems	at	different	levels	of	complexity.	See	H.	Greniewski,	Elementy 
cybernetyki sposobem niematematycznym wyłożone [The elements of cybernetics explicated in non-
mathematical way],	Warszawa,	PWN,	1959;	M.	Mazur,	Cybernetyczna teoria układów samodzielnych 
[Cybernetic theory of independent systems],	Warszawa,	 PWN,	 1966,	 pp.	 35-52;	 P.	 Zonik,	Umysł a 
kultura. Studium neuroantropologiczne w perspektywie teorii działania Friedricha A. Hayeka [Mind 
and Culture. A neuroanthropological study in the perspective of Friedrich A. Hayek’s theory of action],	
retrieved 28 June 2016 from: http://zonik.pl/umyslakultura0/
3	We	define	complexity	as	the	number	of	sub-systems	(in	ontological	sense)	that	constitute	any	given	
system.	Thus	the	question	can	be	raised	what	is	more	complex:	a	star	or	an	earthworm?	According	to	
the	above	mentioned	definition	the	earthworm	is	more	complex	than	the	star	–	it	constitutes	of	more	
sub-systems	that	do	not	exist	in	stars	like	all	amino-acids,	DNA	or	“ladder-like”	nervous	system,	which	
then constitutes of even more sub-systems. In case of human beings the most important sub-system is 
nervous	system	which	allows	them	to	make	convictions	about	the	world	(knowledge),	 that	is	which	
allows	them	to	have	certain	model	of	the	world,	to	communicate,	and	to	act	and	cooperate	(to	move	
their	bodies	 in	purposeful	and	volitional	way).	Each	energo-material	 interaction	can	be	seen	 in	 two	
aspects:	the	energy	flow	and	information	flow,	that	is	the	structure	of	energy	flow.
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Such	characterized	humans	interact	with	each	other	in	various	relations	(which	
are	always	energo-material	interactions	which	means	that	there	is	always	energy	flow	
between	them).	Those	relations	can	be	classified	considering	people’s	volitionality4 
to	comprise	them	as:	voluntary	and	coercive.	This	classification	includes	every	kind	
of	relations	between	people	that	are	the	expression	of	their	will	(or	the	lack	of	will)	
at the moment of partaking in it.
2. Voluntary and coercive relations
Voluntary	relations	are	that	kind	of	where	both	participants	(in	case	of	two-person	
relations) agree to comprise a relation and they can break it by mutual agreement. An 
example of voluntary relation is exchange of goods and services. In that case each 
participant resigns form something he or she possesses (some goods), or something 
he	or	she	disposes	of	(time,	skills),	in	favour	of	something	he	or	she	needs,	and	what	
can be brought by the other side of the relation. Ceteris paribus both sides gain.5
Historically	 significant	 example	 of	 this	 kind	of	 relations	were	 the	 interactions	
between	bourgoise	and	workers	in	the	XIXth century e. g. in English manufactures 
system	 (it	 is	 to	 some	 extent	 a	 canonic	 example	 as	England	 of	 that	 time	was	 the	
birthpoint of industrial revolution).6 An example of such relations in present are all 
market	transactions	of	which	we	are	one	side	e.	g.	when	we	go	shopping	or	conclude	
4	Volitionality	is	what	encompasses	people’s	decisions	and	choices.
5	Situation	when	two	people	decide	to	fight	with	each	other	cannot	be	seen	as	coercive,	because	there’s	
no	force	used	in	decision-making	(exactly	the	opposite	was	in	case	of	Gladiators’	fights	–	they	were	
slaves).	Also	in	a	case	when	a	lifeguard	rescues	a	drowning	person,	he	sometimes	drowns	him/her	a	
little bit (on purpose, in order to stop him/her struggling and let the lifeguard to do the job) there’s 
no	coercion	because	 the	drowning	person	 is	 in	a	very	specific	situation	of	 life	 threat	and	panic	and	
the lifeguard ceteris paribus	 keeps	 the	 agreement	 that	 binds	 him	 (if	we	 are	 talking	 about	 guarded	
swimming	pool	or	swimming	area);	both	sides	would	probably	come	to	terms	with	each	other	if	they	
had time and occasion to do so.
6	“The	salient	fact,	and	one	which	most	writers	fail	to	stress,	is	that,	in	so	far	as	the	work	people	then	
had	a	“choice	of	alternative	benefits”,	they	chose	the	conditions	which	the	reformers	condemned.	Not	
only	did	higher	wages	cause	 them	 to	prefer	 factory	work	 to	other	occupations,	but,	 as	 some	of	 the	
reformers	admitted,	when	one	factory	reduced	its	hours,	 it	would	 tend	to	 lose	 its	operatives	as	 they	
would	transfer	their	services	to	establishments	where	they	could	earn	more”	(W.	H.	Hutt,	“The	Factory	
System of the Early Nineteenth Century”, in Capitalism and Historians, F. A. Hayek (ed.), London 
and	New	York,	Routledge	Kegan	&	Paul,	 2010	 [1954],	 p.	 182).	 See	 also	R.	Hessen,	 “The	Effects	
of the Industrial Revolution on Women and Children”, in A. Rand, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, 
New	York,	A	Signet	Book,	1967,	pp.	110-117;	T.	S.	Ashton,	“The	Standard	of	Life	of	the	Workers	in	
England, 1790-1830”, in Capitalism and..., op. cit.,	pp.	127-159;	C.	Nardinelli,	Industrial Revolution 
and the Standard of Living, retrieved 28 June 2016 from: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/
IndustrialRevolutionandtheStandardofLiving.html;	S.	Richman,	“What	Laissez	Faire?”,	in	G.	Chartier,	
Ch. W. Johnson (eds.), Markets not capitalism: Individualist Anarchism against Bosses, Inequality, 
Corporate Power, and Structural Poverty,	London-New	York-Port	Watson,	Minor	Compositions,	2011,	
pp.	124-126;	R.	T.	Long,	How Government Solved the Health Care Crisis, in ibidem, pp. 315-318.
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an	agreement	with	a	cellphone	company.	Majority	of	this	kind	of	relations,	both	in	
past	and	in	present,	relies	on	verbal	agreement	and	trust.	Even	conflicts	that	may	re-
sult	from	them	are	often	solved	in	the	way	of	voluntary	negotiations	without	public	
courts.7
In	 turn,	 the	coercive	 relations	are	 those	where	one	 side	extorts	 from	 the	other	
side	taking	part	in	the	relation	under	the	threat	of	using	force	(specific	informational	
interaction) or by using force (energetic interaction). The side being extorted has 
no	right	 to	disobey	because	the	extorting	side’s	views	are	being	imposed	on	him/
her	by	force.	In	consequence	there’s	always	some	kind	of	coercive	apparatus	asso-
ciated	with	that	kind	of	relations	that	fulfils	the	will	to	use	force.	For	instance,	in	the	
simplest	case	of	an	assault	the	person	who	expresses	the	will	to	do	so	will	be	at	the	
same	time	the	executor;	but	often,	those	roles	are	separated.	In	coercive	relations,	
there	is	not	only	lack	of	cooperation	present,	there	is	conflict	and	the	situation	when	
one person ceteris paribus gains at the expense of the other person (see footnote 5).
Historic	examples	of	 coercive	 relations	 in	 society	were	 the	 feudal	 relations	of	
the	early	Middle	Ages	based	on	the	assumption	that	the	entire	land	within	certain	
borders	(fields,	woods,	waters	etc.)	belonged	to	the	overlord.	For	instance	in	early	
Piast	dynasty	epoch	on	Polish	grounds	the	land-use	by	the	overlords	was	done	by	
creating	the	estates	gathering	slaves	as	well	as	collecting	benefits	for	the	prince	from	
the	“free	people”	(that	is	non-slaves)	that	made	use	of	the	ruler’s	ownership.8 The 
funds	obtained	from	the	impositions	were	used	by	the	overlord	to	support	two	groups	
of	loyalty:	the	executive	Druzhina	(literally	fellowship;	the	coercion	apparatus	ful-
filling	the	lord’s	will)	and	administration	indispensable	to	governance	(controlling	
and informing the population). It should be noted that knights based their existence 
not	only	on	salary	for	the	fellowship	services	(i.	e.	imposing	the	obedience),	but	also	
on	participating	in	war	expeditions	and	robbery	(which	was	de facto spreading vio-
lence). In peace periods the burden of providing the livelihood to the Druzhina fell 
to the controlled populace.9
7 For example in Poland the legislator had made possible to resolve most of civil cases that might be 
the	subject	of	a	court	settlement	by	arbitrary	courts	(according	to	the	general	law	or	validity	rules).	The	
supporters	of	arbitration	emphasise	its	numerous	advantages	like	low	costs,	and	confidentiality.	See	A.	
Kondrakiewicz,	Private courts in polish civil law	(working	paper,	not	published	yet).	See	also	B.	L.	
Benson, The Enterprise of Law. Justice without the State,	San	Francisco,	Pacific	Research	Institute	for	
Public Policy, 1990, pp. 213-224.
8	 See	 K.	 Modzelewski,	 Organizacja gospodarcza państwa piastowskiego. X-XII wiek [Economic 
structure of Piast Country. X-XII centuries],	Wrocław,	 Zakład	 Narodowy	 im.	 Ossolińskich,	 1975;	
idem, Chłopi w monarchii wczesnopiastowskiej [Peasantry in early Piast monarchy],	Wrocław,	Zakład	
Narodowy	im.	Ossolińskich,	1987.
9	 The	 landlord	 seized	 the	 control	 by	means	 of	 deportation,	 slavery,	 disinheritance	 (confiscation	 of	
property), abductions, blackmail, tortures and – obviously – murders. In practice, on Polish lands of 
the	 early	Middle	Ages	 regular	 invasions	 of	 the	 surrounding	 areas	were	 organized	 from	 the	 already	
controlled	lands.	During	those	invasions	the	conquered	people’s	homes	were	destroyed,	people	were	
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In	feudal	system,	comprising	voluntary	relations	was	very	limited.	In	other	words,	
if	someone	wanted	to	provide	others	with	goods	and	services	e.	g.	by	making	pots	
or	clothing	he	was	forced	to	get	the	permission	from	the	administration	–	in	this	par-
ticular	case	craftsmen’s	guilds	that	were	the	only	organisation	authorised	to	produce	
and sell goods.10	The	guilds	decided	who	may	produce	what,	where,	how	much	and	
even	how.	The	guilds’	monopoly	was	guaranteed	by	the	ruler	and	executed	by	the	
Druzhina	(and	its	local	extension	–	Komes	and	the	borough	crew).	Thus	in	the	legal	
sphere	created	arbitrarily	by	the	ruler	and	his	allies	everyone	who	belonged	to	the	
grey	market	(e.	g.	independent	producers,	travelling	merchants)	was	fought	against	
as “bunglers”.11
The origins of both types of relations are the same: people are open thermody-
namic systems and in order to survive they have to source energy form environment. 
The letter is unpleasant place to live because its resources (crucial for surviving) 
are limited and rare.12 Moreover the environment itself resists to human beings (by 
enslaved	and	deported,	not	infrequently	castrated	and	sold	to	western	Europe	(or	to	Asia	and	Africa).	
The	slave	dealers	trails	went	through	cites	like	Kiev	or	regions	like	Silesia.	The	central	slave	market	of	
that	time	was	in	Prague,	Bohemia.	See	M.	K.	Barański,	Dynastia Piastów w Polsce [Piast Dynasty in 
Poland],	Warszawa,	PWN,	2008;	M.	Bogacki,	Przemiany w wojskowości polskiej od połowy X wieku do 
1138 roku – kształt i organizacja armii [Changes in polish military from the second half of X
th
 century 
to 1138 – the form ad organisation of army],	Toruń,	Adam	Marszałek,	2007;	I.	W.	Korta,	“Problem	
niewolnictwa	w	Polsce	wczesnośredniowiecznej”	[The problem of slavery in early medieval Poland],	
in Społeczeństwo Polski średniowiecznej. Zbiór studiów,	S.	R.	Kuczyński	(ed.),	t.	II,	Warszawa,	1982.	
pp.	82-124;	H.	Zaremska,	“Aspekty	porównawcze	w	badaniach	nad	historią	Żydów	w	średniowiecznej	
Polsce”	[Comparative	aspects	in	research	on	Jews	history	in	medieval	Poland],	in	Rocznik Mazowiecki, 
Vol.	13,	2001,	pp.	177-191;	T.	Lewicki,	“Osadnictwo	słowiańskie	i	niewolnicy	słowiańscy	w	krajach	
muzułmańskich	 według	 średniowiecznych	 pisarzy	 arabskich”	 [Slavonic	 Settlement	 and	 Slavonic	
Slaves	in	Muslim	Countries	According	to	Medieval	Arabic	Writers],	in	Przegląd Historyczny, vol. 43, 
no. 3(4), 1952, pp. 473-491.
10	As	for	the	polish	areas	first	mentions	of	guilds	as	already	formed	organisations	come	from	the	XIVth	
century.
11	 Overlord	 arranged	 the	 fellowship	 in	 the	 strategic	 towns	 of	 the	 conquered	 land.	 The	 beginnings	
of	 new	boroughs	 	were	 often	 garrisons.	 See	K.	Ginter,	 “Problem	drużyny	wczesnośredniowiecznej	
w	Polsce”	 [The issue of fellowship in early Middle Ages in Poland]	 in	Gdańskie Studia z Dziejów 
Średniowiecza,	no.	8,	2002,	pp.	51-74;	M.	Barański,	“Załogi	grodowe	w	Polsce	wczesnopiastowskiej”	
[Town Garrisons in Poland of early Piast]	in	Społeczeństwo Polski Średniowiecznej, no. 6, 1994, pp. 
91-99;	Badania z dziejów rzemiosła i handlu w epoce feudalizmu [Research on the History of Crafts 
and Trade in the Feudal Period],	M.	Małowista	(ed.),	Warszawa,	PWN,	1955;	Z.	Daszyńska-Golińska,	
Miasta i cechy w dawnej Polsce [Towns and guilds in old Poland],	Warszawa,	Bibljoteka	Spółczesna,	
1906;	 I.	 Schiper,	Dzieje handlu żydowskiego na ziemiach polskich [History of Jewish commerce in 
Poland],	Warszawa,	KAW,	1990	[1937].
12	“The	[…]	fact	is	that	there	exist	some	things	which	are	sufficiently	scarce	that	they	cannot	be	used	by	
everyone	as	much	as	each	would	like.	We	cannot	all	have	everything	we	want.	Therefore,	in	any	society,	
there	must	be	some	way	od	deciding	who	gets	to	use	what	when.	You	and	I	cannot	simultaneusly	drive	
the same car to our different homes” (D. Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom. Guide to a Radical 
Capitalism,	La	Salle,	Illinois,	Open	Court,	1989	[1970],	p.	4).
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means of energetic resistance and informative/cognitive resistance).13 In addition the 
relation	between	human	being	and	the	environment	gets	more	complicated	by	the	
fact that people have complex and individualized hierarchy of needs,14	which	is	ob-
served even among moderately homogeneous reference groups, and in the end leads 
to the fact “that different people pursue different ends”.15
In this sense, the pursuit of sourcing energy and survival (both individual and 
species) is  causa causarum	of	cooperation	and	conflict.
3. Voluntary relations vs. coercive relations
History of development of human societies is from the very beginning a compi-
lation	of	the	two	distinguished	kinds	of	relations.	Both	clearly	“transcend”	human	
species. Aggressive behaviour that corresponds directly to the coercive relations is 
explicit feature of nature. Relatively high aggression level in humans seems to be 
an intrinsic feature of human nature, and this is evident from comparative perspec-
tive.16	On	the	other	hand,	 it	 is	not	difficult	 to	find	in	nature	examples	of	complex	
social	orders	where	activity	of	individual	organisms	relies	on	voluntary	relations.	In	
bee	or	termite	communities	the	mutual	communication	occurs	without	central	con-
trol	unit.	Ants	do	not	have	government	that	orders	them	to	behave	in	a	certain	way	
and,	 despite	 of	 that,	 their	 self-organising	dispersed	 community	works	pretty	well	
based on mutual direct interactions and solves problems for more than 100 million 
years.17 Also, in the Neanderthal communities from Middle Palaeolithic (300 thou-
sand	to	40	thousand	years	ago)	we	find	elements	of	voluntary	cooperation.18
13	The	environment	constantly	effects	our	lives	e.	g.	by	cataclysms	or	diseases,	but	also	by	the	laws	of	
nature	itself	and	their	consequences	(expressed	by	changing	seasons	–	winter	hinders	our	survival).
14	People’s	needs	in	general	are	based	on	what	can	be	equated	with	physiological	needs	from	Maslow’s	
hierarchy	of	needs	(See	A.	H.	Maslow,	“A	Theory	of	Human	Motivation”,	in	Psychological Review, 
vol. 50, no. 4, July 1943, pp. 370-396).
15	“Whether	they	are	misers	or	saints,	the	logic	of	the	situation	is	the	same;	it	remains	the	same	as	long	
as	each	person,	observing	reality	from	the	distinct	vantage	point	of	his	own	head,	reaches	a	somewhat	
different	conclusion	about	what	should	be	done	and	how	to	do	it”	(D.	Friedman,	The Machinery…, op. 
cit., p. 4).
16	V.	Georgiev,	A.	C.	E.	Klimczuk,	D.	M.	Traficonte,	D.	Maestripieri,	“When	Violence	Pays:	A	Cost-
Benefit	Analysis	of	Aggressive	Behavior	in	Animals	and	Humans”,	in	Evolutionary Psychology, 11(3), 
2013, pp. 678-699).
17 The mechanism of self-organisation is stigmergy. The idea of stigmergy is that from locally simple 
activation rules of the system’s elements emerges a globally complex order (see P. Zonik, op. cit.). 
See	 also	 J.	T.	Landa,	 “Bioeconomics	 of	 Some	Nonhuman	 and	Human	Societies:	New	 Institutional	
Economics Approach”, in Journal of Bioeconomics,	1(1),	1999,	pp.	95-113;	G.	Tullock,	The Economics 
of Non-Human Societies,	Tuscon,	Pallas,	1994;	V.	Perrichot,	S.	Lacau,	D.	Néraudeau,	A.	Nel,	“Fossil	
evidence for the early ant evolution”, in Naturwissenschaften, 95, 2008, pp. 85-90.
18 Neanderthals planned their activities and subdivided the production stages. The technological 
process	presumably	occurred	at	different	 locations	and	was	done	by	different	 individuals,	what	can	
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It	should	be	noted	that	from	the	economic	point	of	view	voluntary	relations	are 
sine qua non	condition	of	coercive	relations.	This	statement	will	be	more	compre-
hensible	when	we	look	at	the	confluence	of	the	two	types	of	relations,	in	light	of	the	
concept of property. As a source, there are only natural kinds: simple natural kinds 
(substances	like	gold	which	consists	of	atoms	having	79	protons	in	its	nucleus)	and	
complex systems composed of simple natural kinds and intermediate systems (e. g. 
organic compounds) in various combinations, e. g. human. Thus before one makes 
(de facto processes)	anything,	one	has	to	possess	something	in	the	first	place.	Human	
can possess something that:
(a)	belonged	to	nobody	before,	and	was	found,
(b) he made himself (form natural kinds) or in cooperation,
(c) he got in exchange for something else (market exchange transaction that is 
not a fraud).
From this perspective, coercive relations are perforce based on voluntary rela-
tions,	as	no	thing	can	be	taken	away	from	somebody,	who	has	not	found	that	thing,	
has	not	made	that	thing	or	has	not	exchanged	that	thing.	The	work	of	creator	precedes	
the	need	of	beneficiary.
Cooperation is rooted in voluntary relations. They are connected to the division 
of	 labour	 in	 society	 thanks	 to	which	 our	 civilization	 exists	 and	 survives.	On	 the	
contrary,	violence	is	used	by	those,	who	do	not	want	to	take	part	in	the	anarchy	of	
production (voluntary relations and spontaneous orders based on them) and prefer 
to	live	at	the	expense	of	those	who	do.	Coercive	relations	allow	certain	groups	of	
people	to	realize	their	consumptive	needs	(from	the	bottom	of	Maslow’s	hierarchy),	
and	mental	needs	(dreams,	concepts,	desires,	ambitions)	at	the	expense	of	those	who	
are the modes of the anarchy of production (see footnote 14).
4. Evolution of voluntary and coercive relations
Primary	feudal	relations	went	through	institutional	changes	e.	g.	to	the	form	of	
absolute monarchy (France, Spain) constitutional monarchy (England) or szlachta 
(nobility) democracy	(Polish–Lithuanian	Commonwealth).	However	from	the	social	
cybernetics	point	of	view,	until	 the	 Industrial	Revolution,	 that	 form	of	 ruling	had	
nearly the same energo-material constitution (sub-systems and their bindings) as its 
be interpreted as the beginning of the division of labour. It required “adequate level of organisation 
and	more	advanced	system	of	communication	(language)”	(J.	K.	Kozłowski,	“Człowiek	neandertalski	
i	odrębność	rozwoju	kulturowego	w	środkowym	paleolicie”	[Homo sapiens neanderthalensis and the 
distinctiveness	of	cultural	development	in	Middle	Palaeolithic],	in		idem (ed.), Encyklopedia historyczna 
świata,	Tom	I.	Prehistoria,	Kraków,	Agencja	Publicystyczno-Wydawnicza	Opres,	1999,	p.	52).
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medieval	prototype.	Generally	speaking	it	was	a	socio-economic	system	based	on	
forcibly	executed	privileges	for	closed	social	groups	which	membership	was	grant-
ed	due	to	birth	and	was	inherited.19 The rise of sub-systems rooted in coercive re-
lations	was	largely	motivated	by	interest	of	people	clinging	the	power	(that	is	the	
appropriate	energetic	and	informative	means)	which	allowed	them	to	impose	their	
convictions on others. Over the ages the representatives of all sub-systems creating 
the	government	(strict	political	elite,	army	and	administration)	did	things	in	the	first	
place	to	improve	their	wealth,	and	then	to	consolidate	it	to	their	heirs.20
Industrial	Revolution	started	the	new	era	in	the	possibility	of	making	voluntary	
agreements. All forms of glebae ascripti disappeared, the development of capital-
ism put an end to the guilds. Consequently, most people’s actions stopped being so 
remarkably	dependent	at	the	minority’s	decisions,	as	it	was	hitherto.	For	instance,	
as	peasant	initially	was	not	an	owner	but	“a	thing	supported	to	that	ones	for	who	he	
worked”,21	in	capitalism	he	gained	the	opportunity	to	work	for	himself	and	change	
19	“Two	hundred	years	ago,	before	the	advent	of	capitalism,	a	man’s	social	status	was	fixed	from	the	
beginning	to	the	end	of	his	life;	he	inherited	it	from	his	ancestors,	and	it	never	changed.	If	he	was	born	
poor,	he	always	remained	poor,	and	if	he	was	born	rich—a	lord	or	a	duke—he	kept	his	dukedom	and	
the	property	that	went	with	it	for	the	rest	of	his	life.	As	for	manufacturing,	the	primitive	processing	
industries	of	those	days	existed	almost	exclusively	for	the	benefit	of	the	wealthy.	Most	of	the	people	
(ninety	percent	 or	more	of	 the	European	population)	worked	 the	 land	 and	did	 not	 come	 in	 contact	
with	the	city-oriented	processing	industries.	This	rigid	system	of	feudal	society	prevailed	in	the	most	
developed	areas	of	Europe	for	many	hundreds	of	years.	However,	as	the	rural	population	expanded,	
there	developed	a	surplus	of	people	on	the	land.	For	this	surplus	of	population	without	inherited	land	or	
estates,	there	was	not	enough	to	do,	nor	was	it	possible	for	them	to	work	in	the	processing	industries;	
the	kings	of	the	cities	denied	them	access.	The	numbers	of	these	“outcasts”	continued	to	grow,	and	still	
no	one	knew	what	to	do	with	them.	They	were,	in	the	full	sense	of	the	word,	“proletarians”,	outcasts	
whom	the	government	could	only	put	into	the	workhouse	or	the	poorhouse.	In	some	sections	of	Europe,	
especially in the Netherlands and in England, they became so numerous that, by the eighteenth century, 
they	were	a	real	menace	to	the	preservation	of	the	prevailing	social	system”	(L.	von	Mises,	Economic 
Policy. Thoughts for Today and Tomorrow,	Alabama,	Ludwig	von	Mises	 Institute,	2006	[1979],	pp.	
1-2).
20 The consequence of ontological situation of an individual is that he or she may aim at satisfying 
his	or	her	self-interest	shown	in	his/her	decisions	and	actions.	Regarding	the	other	individual	he	can	
at most negotiate the range and the goal of cooperation. Thus man aims at maximizing the subjective 
profit,	which	means	 that	 there	 are	 clearly	 visible	 irrational	 elements	 in	 human	 actions	 like	 autistic	
thinking	(escaping	from	reality),	ignorance	(confusing	the	model	of	reality	with	the	reality	and	invalid	
identification	of	casual	relations),	wishful	thinking	(confusing	declarations/expectations	with	the	real	
consequences	of	actions).	Taking	care	of	self-interest	in	the	first	place	as	well	as	its	consequences	for	
others	is	of	natural	descent.	See	T.	Clutton-Brock,	“Cooperation	between	non-kin	in	animal	societies”,	
in Nature, 462, 2009, pp. 51-57.
21	 J.	 S.	 Dembowski,	 Rzecz krótka o Fabryce Sukienney Krakowskiey [A short thing on the cloth 
manufacture in Cracow],	Kraków,	Szkoła	Główna	Koronna,	1791,	s.	9.
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his	 conditions	 –	 dwelling	 place22	 and	 wealth.23 Regarding the entire society, the 
possibility	to	comprise	voluntary	relations	allowed	the	poorest	to	find	a	way	out	of	
poverty (see footnote 6). As Polish theoretician of civilization Feliks Koneczny not-
ed:	“individual’s	wealth	does	not	come	from	neighbour’s	poverty,	but	is	the	essential	
initial	condition	to	the	latter’s	wealth	(they	cannot	be	wealthy	all	at	once).	Somebody	
has	to	grow	wealthy	first	and	give	the	others	from	his	gain”.24	XIX
th
 century mar-
ket	order	not	only	created	the	plenty	of	goods	and	services,	but	basically	the	life	we	
know	today.25
However,	contrary	to	 to	 the	widespread	belief	 the	era	following	the	Industri-
al	Revolution	did	not	started	a	new	way	of	 thinking	about	 the	character	of	gov-
ernance. Today representative democracies are – from cybernetics of governance 
point	of	view	–	systems	with	almost	identical	structure	as	patriarchal	monarchies.	
Admittedly	their	motto	seems	different:	“there	is	no	longer	a	powerful	king,	so	our	
representatives	can	now	shape	the	legal	system	to	benefit	the	public	at	large”,26 but 
22	In	reference	to	polish	lands	it	looked	this	way:	“cottages	dark,	cramped,	low,	dirty,	more	like	a	pigsty	
or	a	grave	than	a	building	for	living	people”	(unnamed	author,	“Uwagi	nad	sposobem	wydoskonalenia	
rolnictwa	w	Polsce”	[Remarks on the approach to improve the agriculture in Poland],	 in	Pamiętnik 
Historyczno-Polityczny przypadków, ustaw, osób, miejsc i pism wiek nasz szczególniej interesujących, 
P.	Świtkowski	(ed.),	Grudzień,	1784,	p.	1148).
23	 The	 reason	 of	 people’s	 poverty	 was	 that	 they	 worked	 for	 the	 ruler	 and	 did	 not	 have	 time	 and	
opportunity	to	work	for	themselves.	This	is	how	Józef	Pawlikowski	described	it:	“Their	[peasants]	all	
free	time	is	taken	away	by	the	overlord,	so	when	a	peasant	is	supposed	to	work	for	himself,	how	will	he	
get	wealthy	if	he	has	no	time	to	work	for	himself?	[…]	Maintaining	property	requires	labour	input,	but	
man-slaves	like	our	peasants	do	not	wish	to	work	because	if	they	are	not	even	their	own	masters	then	
how	they	are	supposed	to	be	the	owners	of	the	land?	A	free	man	willingly	makes	labour	input,	willingly	
works	for	his	own	property,	because	he	is	aware	of	the	unbreachable	law	that	is	bound	to	his	property,	
and	which	cannot	be	broken	by	no	hand	except	his	own,	a	great	law	that	is	called	shortly:	it	is	mine”	(J.	
Pawlikowski,	O poddanych polskich [On Polish subjects],	no	publishing	place,	1788,	pp.	28	&	57-58).
24 F. Koneczny, Państwo i prawo [State and Law],	Kraków,	Wydawnictwo	WAM,	1997,	p.	25.
25 “The Industrial Revolution represented a quantum leap in the complexity of economic life. A 
bewildering	variety	of	new	industries	and	occupations	arose.	Production	techniques	became	vastly	more	
complicated	as	mechanization	developed	and	spread.	Mass	distribution	and	marketing	spun	sprawling,	
intricate	 webs	 that	 connected	 producers	 and	 customers.	 Countless	 organizational	 innovations	 were	
devised	 to	manage	successfully	 the	high-volume,	high-speed	flows	of	 inputs	and	goods	 through	 the	
proliferating	new	production	and	distribution	systems.	In	short,	 industrialization	entailed	a	dramatic	
elaboration	 of	 the	 division	 of	 labor,	 the	 result	 of	which	was	 to	 expand	 the	 horizons	 of	 achievable	
prosperity beyond all prior imaginings” (B. Lindsey, Against the Dead Hand. The Uncertain Struggle 
for Global Capitalism,	John	Wiley	&	Sons,	New	York,	2002,	p.	38).
26 B. L. Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State,	San	Francisco,	Pacific	Research	
Institute	for	Public	Policy,	1990,	p.	76.	 In	our	 time	we	can	observe	a	conspicuous	phenomenon	of	
rent	seeking,	which	means	that	some	groups	of	people	seek	such	a	security	of	their	living	conditions	
that	gives	them	measurable	benefits	at	the	expense	of	the	rest	of	society	(ability	to	capture	incomes	
without	producing	output	or	making	a	productive	contribution).	There	are	three	main	groups	of	this	
sort: professional politicians, administrative apparatus (bureaucracy) and “private” companies under 
the	 aegis	 of	 crony	 capitalism.	 Professional	 politicians	 do	 not	 pursuit	 of	win	 in	 order	 to	 introduce	
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as	accurately	noted	Bruce	L.	Benson	there	are	two	problems	with	this	argument.	
Firstly,	when	Western	countries	abandoned	monarchy	and	liberalized	the	possibil-
ities of voluntary interactions, they still did not rejected the idea of government 
itself (strict political elite, army, administration – mechanism of redistribution le-
gitimized	by	law)	and	in	consequence	the	coercive	relations	that	underlie	this	idea	
(in genetic, structural and functional sense). Secondly, although collecting goods 
and	centralization	of	power	(“privileges”)	may	not	be	what	people	making	govern-
ment	declare	to	be	their	goal	in	the	first	place,	these	are	anyway	the	essential	con-
sequences	of	partaking	in	the	system	which	original	goal	was	exactly	like	this.27
 
“Whether	the	government	producing	law	is	a	totalitarian	king	or	a	representative	
democracy,	power	is	centralized	and	coercion	is	used	to	impose	rules	beneficial	to	
some	upon	the	rest	of	the	population.	Government	is	still	a	wealth	transfer	mech-
anism”.28
 
Thirdly,	what	Benson	does	not	mention,	human	as	such	hasn’t	changed	
–	he	still	aims	at	reaching	his	own	goals	and	uses	weak	models	of	reality	(see	foot-
note	20).	This	is	why	the	contemporary	example	of	coercive	relations,	that	comes	
form the Middle Ages, is not the existence of regulations or taxation, but existence 
of the state per se.29
reforms,	but	to	win	the	elections.	As	Thomas	Sowell	said:	“No	one	will	really	understand	politics	until	
they understand that politicians are not trying to solve our problems. They are trying to solve their 
own	problems	–	of	which	getting	elected	and	re-elected	are	number	one	and	number	two.	Whatever	
is	number	 three	 is	 far	behind”.	T.	Sowell,	Solving Whose Problem?, retrieved 29 June 2016 from: 
https://www.creators.com/read/thomas-sowell/11/09/solving-whose-problem;	And	 as	 B.	 F.	 Skinner	
noted:	 “The	 politicians	 guess	 at	 all	 the	 answers	 and	 spend	 their	 time	 persuading	 people	 they’re	
right-but	 they	must	 know	 they’re	 only	 guessing,	 that	 they	 haven’t	 really	 proved anything” (B. F. 
Skinner, Walden Two,	Indianapolis/Cambridge,	Hackett	Publishing	Company,	2005	[1948],	p.	4).	In	
this	regard	it	is	unusually	naïve,	if	not	stupid,	to	treat	the	civil	servants	as	someone	who	protects	the	
interests	of	everybody	else’s	more	than	his	own	and	his	relatives	(see	footnotes	20	and	6).	See	(easy	
theoretical introduction) G. Tullock, Public Goods, Redistribution and Rent Seeking, Cheltenham 
–	Northampton,	Edward	Elgar,	2005,	pp.	92-100.	 (Theoretical	 elaboration	and	practical	 examples)	
Efficient Rent-Seeking. Chronicle of an Intellectual Quagmire,	A.	A.	Lockard,	G.	Tullock	(eds.),	New	
York,	Springer,	2001;	G.	Tullock,	The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock. Vol. 5: The Rent-Seeking 
Society, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 2005.
27 Ibidem, pp. 76-77.
28 Ibidem, p. 77.
29	A	short	introduction	to	libertarian	concept	of	goverment	with	references	to	the	classics	e.	g.	Étienne	de	
la Boétie (1530-1563), Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), Franz Oppenheimer (1864-1943), Albert J. Nock 
(1870-1945), Henry L. Mencken (1880-1956), Frank Chodorov (1887-1966), Bertrand de Jouvenel 
(1903-1987), James M. Buchanan (1919-2013), Gordon Tullock (1922-2014) see M. N. Rothbard, 
Anatomy of the State,	Alabama,	Ludwig	von	Mises	Institute,	2009.	See	also	A.	de	Jasay,	The State, 
Indianapolis,	Liberty	Fund,	1998	[1985].
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5. Conclusions
To sum up, according to game theory, voluntary relations are undoubtedly a posi-
tive-sum	game,	as	both	sides	of	it	gain.	In	other	words,	in	case	of	voluntary	relations,	
each	player,	who	follows	his	own	strategy,	wins	something,	what	 then	allows	 the	
others,	who	do	not	possess	anything,	or	who	possess	little,	to	change	their	situation	
for better.30	Of	course	 in	capitalistic	market	characterised	 in	well-developed	divi-
sion	of	labour	the	payoff	matrix	is	seldom	symmetric.	The	thing	is,	however,	that	we	
do	not	know	any	way	to	improve	both	players’	wealth,	other	than	voluntary	relation.	
Any	other	kind	of	relation	will	lead	to	one	side’s	wrong,	and	eventually	to	a	conflict.	
A	participant	in	voluntary	relation	must	be	aware	of	that	asymmetry	of	payoff,	but	
his gain is enough reason to comprise it.
Coercive	 relations	 regarded	 in	 individual	 dimension	 (as	 a	 relation	 between	
e. g. ruler collecting tributes and the subject), from the game theory point of 
view,	certainly	were,	initially,	zero-sum	games	because	both	sides’	interests	were	
opposed	 (the	 ruler’s	 gain	 was,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 subject’s	 loss,	 especially	
in	the	view	of	limited	resources	and	insufficient	development	of	the	anarchy	of	
production).	Today	however,	 tax-payers	often	do	not	feel	as	victims	because	of	
paying taxes,31	so	in	that	case	(after	several	clarifications	that	would	have	to	be	
made) the coercive relation could even be interpreted as a positive-sum game.32 
30	To	put	some	problematicity	to	our	point	of	view:	analysed	types	of	situations	should	be	placed	in	
a	range	between	failures	situations	(when	the	exchange	occurred,	but	the	participant	for	some	reason	
decided to get back to status quo)	and	fruitful	situations	(situations	that	create	new	conditions	satisfying	
both	sides).	Any	way	voluntary	relations		assume	the	possibility	of	negotiations	(see	footnote	7).
31	Many	people	claim	that	they	pay	taxes	voluntarily.	This	statement	however	does	not	express	anything	
and	is	pointless,	because	tax-paying	has	nothing	to	do	with	freedom	of	choice.	Indirect	taxes	like	VAT	
or	excise	tax	are	surely	paid	by	everyone	who	consumes	any	buys	products	in	government	concessioned	
stores (that is “legal”). Direct taxes imposed on income or private property the taxpayer is obliged to pay 
by himself. For tax avoidance results in penalties and eventually prison. Long-term penalty avoidance 
as	well	as	resisting	the	officials	who	only	“execute	the	orders”	will	lead	to	battery,	abjection	or	simply	
death.	The	relation	between	the	tax-payer	and	the	democratic	authority	is	by	all	means	coercive.
32 This issue is related to the entire spectrum of beliefs (expressed as rhetoric questions) like: “If not 
government,	then	who	would	build	roads?”,	“If	not	government,	then	who	would	protect	me	from	the	
bad	guys?”.	These	kinds	of	arguments	can	be	challenged	in	a	very	simple	way	by	asking	a	question	
in	 the	 same	 symmetrically	 general	 manner	 in	 light	 of	Aztec	 civilization:	 “If	 not	 human	 sacrifice,	
then	who	would	feed	the	Sun?”.	Just	because	someone	doesn’t	see	a	solution	is	not	an	argument	for	
disallowing	the	others	the	possibility	to	solve	it.	On	the	subject	of	roads:	see	B.	Powell,	Sell the Streets, 
retrieved	 29	 June	 2016	 from:	 http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2009/Powellstreets.html;	 K.	
A. Carson, The Distorting Effects of Transportation Subsidies, retrieved 29 June 2016 from: https://
fee.org/articles/the-distorting-effects-of-transportation-subsidies;	 S.	 Ikeda,	Urban Design and Social 
Complexity,	retrieved	29	June	2016	from:	https://fee.org/articles/urban-design-and-social-complexity;	
R. G. Holcombe, Common property in Anarcho-Capitalism, Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 19, No. 
2,	2006,	pp.	3-29.	In	turn,	regarding	the	issue	of	individual	defence	(self-defence)	it	is	worth	knowing,	
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However,	 considering	 coercive	 relations	 in	 individual	 dimension	 is	misleading	
because	 it	 doesn’t	 show	 the	 full	 range	of	 energetic	 interactions	 in	 society.	 Im-
portant	factor	of	coercive	relations,	which	is	unveiled	in	system’s	theory	point	of	
view,	is	the	disastrous	and	dissipative	role	of	administration	(see	footnote	26).	In	
global	perspective	of	game	theory	we	can	easily	see	that	the	existence	of	states	
and everything that that they carry only initially can be zero-sum games. In long 
term perspective they are most often negative-sum games, especially in respect 
to contemporary democracies. The existence of a government results in its over-
growth	 and	 consumes	 so	much	of	 collected	 funds	 (such	 centralization	 leads	 to	
economy	collapse	or	war).	Paradoxically,	both	sides	of	such	coercive	relation	will	
lose.	In	other	words,	everyone	contributes,	but	later,	almost	everybody	gain	from	
the “business” much less than the contribution they made.33
Voluntary relations and cooperation are extremely important negentropic fac-
tors, because they are de facto	a	systemic	way	of	input	processing	in	the	whole	
society,	which	gives	the	advantage	in	survival,	in	comparison	to,	“just”,	individ-
ual cognition and its consequences. Joint problem-solving based on voluntary re-
lations	is	the	first	step	to	the	development	of	cognitive	division	of	labour	i.	e.	pro-
ducing	various	kinds	of	knowledge	and	various	actions	(socio-economic	division	
of labour). Comprising voluntary relations leads to the creation of dispersed sys-
tem of spontaneous decision-making (Cosmos type order, according to Hayek). 
This kind of order emerges from mutual non-violent interactions of individuals, 
it is not a product of intelligence, that is, it is not intentionally created according 
to some in advance made assumptions, or devised plan.34 It is simply extended 
that	 in	Milwaukee	County	 the	average	 response	 time	of	 the	police	called	 to	a	crime	(mostly,	brutal	
incidents	with	 theoretically	 the	highest	 priority)	measured	over	 the	 course	of	 several	 years	 are:	 for	
burglary	–	52	minutes,	for	armed	robberies	–	20	minutes,	for	sexual	assaults	–	59	minutes,	for	gunfights	
–	over	one	hour	(see	Sheriff	David	A	Clarke	Interview,	retrieved	29	June	2016	from:	https://vimeo.
com/136379844). In contrast, the USA Department of Justice estimates, that the realistic response 
time of the police is around 10 minutes (see C. Bialik, “Detroit Police Response Times No Guide to 
Effectiveness”,	retrieved	29	June	2016	from:	http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323997
004578642250518125898).	But,	as	accurately	noticed	the	author	of	the	blog:	http://www.hoplofobia.
info/,	even	the	idealized,	proverbial	“three	minutes”	are	still	far	too	long	in	the	real	world.	The	only	
alternative is self-defence.
33	 Additionally,	 in	 view	 of	 Austrian	 Economic	 School,	 the	 “government	 investments”	 made	 by	
civil	servants	are	most	often	malinvestments,	 that	 is	wrong	investments,	and	that	means	that	 their	
outlays	(costs)	will	not	return	(and,	in	extreme	cases,	will	be	completely	wasted).	See	L.	J.	Sechrest,	
“Explaining Malinvestment and Overinvestment”, in Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 9 
(4), 2006, pp. 27-38.
34	Certain	people,	being	a	part	of	net	of	voluntary	relations,	may	only	have	knowledge	of	the	general	
principle	 of	 the	 plan’s	 organization	 because,	 considering	 people’s	 nature,	 they	 cannot	 know	 all	 the	
conditions	of	time	and	space,	which	constitute	this	kind	of	(or	any	other)	spontaneous	order.
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nature	state	which	“discusses”	with	nature	on	behalf	of	people	by	trial-and-error.	
The	 effect	 of	 system’s	work	 is	 the	 production	 of	 various	material	 goods	 (both	
consumptive goods and capital goods).35
35 See G. Callahan, Economics for Real People. An Introduction to the Austrian School, Alabama, 
Ludwig	von	Mises	Institute,	2004	[2002];	L.	E.	Read,	I, Pencil: My Family Tree as told to Leonard 
E. Read,	 retrieved	28	June	2016	 from:	http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/rdPncl1.html.	See	also	
an	 animation	 contributed	 to	 Read’s	work,	 retrieved	 28	 June	 2016	 from:	 https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=IYO3tOqDISE	 as	 well	 as	 commentaries	 (Art	 Carden,	 Deirdre	 McCloskey,	 Lawrence	W.	
Reed, Walter E. Williams): I, Pencil Extended Commentary: Spontaneous Order,	https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=yFeGNX06Zmk;	I, Pencil Extended Commentary: Creative Destruction,	https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=8N08Kkjq9gA;	 I, Pencil Extended Commentary: Trade and Specialization, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kw1kODe7eDU;	 I, Pencil Extended Commentary: Connectivity, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PwHvizPqpWI	(all	retrieved	28	June	2016).
